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AN EVALUATION OF THE ANDEAN PACT
RAFAEL VARGAS-HIDALGO*
The Andean Pact crisis reflects the problems encountered by those
developing countries which implement the economic integration system. As
the countries of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela continue
to be members of the Andean Pact,' also known as the Cartagena Agree-
ment, it is important to consider some proposals for the revitalization of the
economic integration system.
The main obstacles to the success of the Andean Pact and those
generally affecting economic integration systems among developing coun-
tries are politicization, unequal distribution of benefits and costs, and in-
compatibility of economic policies. Each is defined in terms of its specific ef-
fect on the goals of the Andean Pact.
Politicization, as presented in the context here, is the process through
which conflicting perceptions of the common interest within the integration
system become more prominent. In this conflicting situation, the national
interest appears more immediate, actual and urgent than the integration
goal, which is perceived as distant, uncertain and less attractive from a
domestic point of view. Since 1973, it is possible to observe an increasing
degree of politicization, despite the Cartagena Agreement's process. Ac-
cording to Nye's classification, 2 this phenomenon was premature since it oc-
curred before supportive attitudes were sufficiently crystallized and struc-
tured. The members began to pay more attention to their particular
economic interests than to those of the Andean region as a whole. The
process of politicization was most clearly demonstrated in Chile, but its ef-
fect was felt by the other members as well. The situation fostered distrust
and diminished the Pact's integration capabilities.
A preeminent concern among the parties of the Andean Pact has been
the maintenance of equality of the benefits and costs derived from the in-
tegration system, a concern most acutely felt in the 1974-76 period. A
primary reason for the creation of the Cartagena Agreement was that the
most powerful members of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, were obtaining a dispropor-
*S.J.D, Harvard University; LIM, Harvard; J.D (Hons.), Catholic University of Chile.
1. Cartagena Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 Int'l Leg. Mat. 910 (1969). For a Spanish text
see Compilaci6n de Documentos Relacionados con el Acuerdo dc Cartegena 67 (1975)
[hereinafter Compilaci6n].
2 J. Nye, Peace In Parts 89 (1971).
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tionally major benefit from this system.' In addition, the Andean countries
had prior experience with other integration schemes, such as the Central
American Common Market where in 1965, El Salvador and Guatemala had
acquired seventy percent of the industrial exports of this system., In con-
sideration of previous inter-American resolutions on this subject,5 the An-
dean Pact establishes as one of its main policies, a special treatment for the
less developed countries in the region, Bolivia and Ecuador.6 The Conven-
tion states that to further the progressive elimination of the differences
presently existing in the development of the area, Bolivia and Ecuador shall
be permitted to achieve a more accelerated rate of economic development
through effective and immediate participation in the advantages of the in-
dustrialization of the area and liberalization of trade.' To implement this
result, there are special provisions applicable to Bolivia and Ecuador
regarding harmonization of economic policies and coordination of develop-
ment plans, industrial policy, commercial policy, the Common External
Tariff, financial cooperation, and technical assistance. However, while
equity in the distribution of costs and benefits is more acute in the less
developed countries, the other members of an integration system are con-
cerned with this problem as well, as the equitable distribution of costs and
benefits ultimately determines the voluntary and permanent participation of
member States.
The measurement of the distribution of costs and benefits involves dif-
fering perceptions among the member countries as to
the costs and benefits and as to the valuation to be given to their
various components, the time-periods over which they are to be
assessed and the valuation implications of these time-periods, am-
biguities in the determination of disparities in development in the
context of the distribution policies of regional economic integra-
tion schemes, the definition of an equitable distribution of costs
and benefits, identification of distributable and non-distributable
costs and benefits, the separation of the effects of regional
economic policies and characteristics, the determination of the in-
direct effects of costs and benefits arising from regional economic
integration and the valuation of the direct and indirect effects of
3. See G. Salgado, Ecuador y la Inegraci6n Economica de America Latina 177 (1970).
This situation violated the purpose stated in the Preamble of the Montevideo Treaty (1960)
which established LAFTA. This inequality is shown, for instance, in LAFTA's Complementa-
tion Agreements.
In fact, of the twenty Complementation Agreements already established, Brazil par-
ticipates in 17 (85 percent), Argentina and Mexico in 14 (70 percent), Chile in 6 (30 percent),
Peru and Colombia in 2 (10 percent), Bolivia in 1 (5 percent), and Paraguay in none. See Tironi,
Las Estrategias Nacionales de Desarrollo y la Integracidn de los Paises A ndinos, 9 Estudios Inter-
nacionales 66 (1976) [hereinafter Tironi].
4. G. Salgado, supra note 3, at 14.
5. See, e.g., Declarations of the Presidents, April 14, 1967, of America, pt. 11, Ch. 1, § 1, 6
Int'l Leg. Mat. 714 (1967).
6. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 1, at 929. Also, the Convention is concerned with this
problem throughout its provisions; See, e.g., art. 2, at 910.
7. Id., art. 91 at 933.
8. See Current Problems of Economic Integration 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/517 (1975).
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regional infrastructure undertakings.9
The determination of the criteria involved is resolved by governments
according to political rather than technical criteria. The result is that pure
political judgments on such a delicate issue hinder the stability of the in-
tegration process. However, while assessing the distribution of costs and
benefits, governments often consider issues of economic development and
the success of the integration system as well. There is also a tendency to dis-
regard the disparities existing prior to the establishment of the integration
system, such as the degree of industrialization and managerial capacity, and
those inequalities that increase after the country has joined the system.
The third major cause of the Cartagena Agreement's crisis was the in-
compatibility of the economic policies pursued by the signatories. In 1969,
the convention was concluded when a consensus had been reached on the
economic model to be used for the Andean development. The model called
for a "mixed" economy, with reform in the traditional capitalist system and
a greater role for the State in economic matters, but with the maintenance of
a favorable climate for private enterprise participation. This economic ap-
proach was implemented by Frei's government in Chile and by Lleras
Restrepo's in Colombia, advocates for the establishment of this integration
system. This model was further supported by the fortunate conjuction in
1968-69 of plan-oriented, modernizing governments in Chile, Colombia,
and Peru, with the revitalization of national planning by these govern-
ments."0 Thus, the mixed economy model, perceived by each government in
a different way, was manifested in the Andean Pact's mechanisms. Even-
tually, many States changed this view as a result of their own shifts in
economic policies and general political orientations, an inevitable develop-
ment considering the highly unstable political situation in the Andean
region.
The Cartagena Agreement emphasized the need to achieve a har-
monization of national policies and coordination of plans as a first step
towards its ultimate goal of joint planning. However, by 1974 the process of
harmonization of national policies, which held much potential for higher
forms of integration, prevented further progress. Shortly before the
signature of the Pact, Peru and then Chile, in 1970, changed their mixed
economy model for a planned one with socialist learnings. But the most
serious problems with the incompatibility of policies occurred in September
1973 when Chile initiated its free-market model. Nonetheless, between 1969-
73, these parties were able to pursue their integrative experience, and the
Convention survived an average of two changes of government per
country."
9. Id. at 11.
10. The Chilean National Planning Office, ODEPLAN, has been given great importance.
It was created by Law 16,635 of July 14, 1967.
I1. Actually the mathematic Figure is 2.5. To calculate this number, Venezuela has been
discarded since this country adhered to the Convention in 1973. The changes of government per
country are the following: Bolivia: Luis Adolfo Siles (1969), General Alfredo Ovando (1969-
70), General Juan Joge Torres (1970-71), and General Hugo Banzer (1971- ); Chile: Eduardo
Frei (1964-70), Salvador Allende (1970-73) and General Augusto Pinochet (1973-); Colombia:
Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-74); Ecuador: Jose Maria
Velasco Ibarra (1968-75).
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1I
The problems of politicization, unequal distribution of costs and
benefits, and the incompatibility of policies were clearly present in the
measures taken in connection with the Foreign Investment Code, the Com-
mon External Tariff, the Program of Trade Liberalization, and the In-
dustrial Program. The conflicts occurring with respect to these programs
contributed to the Andean Crisis.
The more prominent clashes within the Andean Pact began in 1974
with a discussion of the foreign investment code, known as Decision 24.12
This resolution was approved within the first months of the Cartagena
Agreement's existence, with the hope that in this way foreign investments
could be directed towards development in accordance with the govern-
ment's will. In the past, severe regulations by individual States caused the
flight of foreign capital to other countries.
Decision 24 was put into operation in some countries, such as Chile and
Colombia, despite internal legal problems. In the beginning, the Andean
governments showed great enthusiasm in the application of this Code, being
one of the few examples of unanimous formal internal implementation of an
Andean Decision. However, in practice, interpretation and application were
not uniform, especially after 1973 when important political and economic
12. Decision No. 24 of the Commission of the Catagena Agreement, third period of the
Commission's Special Meetings, December 14, 1970, I Instruments of Economic Integration in
Latin America and the Caribbean 296 [hereinafter Economic Integration]. For a Spanish text,
see Compilaci6n 105 (1975).
The Cartagena Agreement established in article 27, supra note 1, at 917, (also see art. 26
par., and supra note 1, at 917) that this resolution had to be taken before December 31, 1970.
Decision 24 has been modified by Decision 37 (fourth period of the Commission's special
meetings, June 1971), Decision 103 (twentieth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings,
October, 1976) and Decision 109 (twenty-first period of the Commission's ordinary meetings,
November, 1976).
Since June 30, 1971, that common regime for treatment of foreign capital has been in force
among the parties (in this respect See 4 Grupo Andino 1-2, 1971). In connection with Decision
24, the Commission has approved Decisions 47 and 48, both of November 18, 1971. Decision
47 deals with regulations concerning state participation in mixed companies and Decision 48
with regulations applicable to investments made by the Andean Development Corporation and
any of the parties. See text of Decision 47, 1 Instruments 343 and Decision 48, 1 Instruments
344.
In connection with the Andean Foreign Investment Code, see generally Armstrong,
Political Components and Practical Effects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 1597 (1975); Furnish, Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investments,
5 Vand. J. Transnat'l 313 (1972); Guerrero, El Regimen Comun de la Inversion Extranjera en el
Grupo Andino, 8 Derecho de la Integraci6n 8 (1971); Matter, Die Bestimmungen des Andepaktes
Uiber die Gemeinsame Behand lung des Auslidnd kapitals, 27 Aussenwirtschaft (St. Gallen) 56
(1972); Mirabito, The Control of Technology Transfer. 9 Int'l Law 215 (1975); Oliver. The An-
dean Foreign Investment Code, 66 Am. J. Int'l Law 763 (1972); Palacio, El Acuerdo sobre
Capitales Extranjeros en el Grupo Andino, I Rev. Cfimara de Comercio de Bogota 33 (1971);
Salgado, El Grupo Andino y la Inversi6n Extranjera, 23 Comercio Exterior 154 (1973);
Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Iniestment in the Andean Common Market. 5 Int'l Law 586
(1971); Schliesser and Thoma, Bcschrdn kungen Fur Aussenwirtschaftsdients des Betriebs -
Beraters 282 (1971); Wionczeck, U.S. Reaction to the Andean Group System for Treatment of
Foreign Capital, 17 Comercio Exterior 27 (1970).
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changes began to take place within the region. These changes determined
the end of the economic and political consensus that made possible in 1970
the issuance of Decision 24. Ecuador and Venezuela dramatically incre-
mented their capital after the 1973 OPEC's fourfold oil price increase. Chile
was in a prostrated economic situation, as was Peru, after two years of social
and political unrest. At the end of 1973, Chile transformed its economic
model into a free-market form. As a result, some countries had begun to
wonder whether Decision 24 was too severe, and thus discouraged foreign
investment.
The political changes in the region were reflected in the different
governments of President Allende and General Pinochet. With respect to
foreign investments, Allende's advisers believed in the possibility of achiev-
ing development without the need of foreign capital. The inauguration of
Allende's administration was greeted with the appearance of a book that
strongly defended this position. 3 Practice soon proved this theory inade-
quate, and Allende reassured foreign investors that they would be treated
under Decision 24 and that Chile required foreign investments. However,
the level of foreign investments in Chile declined due to the nationalizations
which took place under his regime, important international business opposi-
tion to that government, and the generally chaotic Chilean political and
economic situation. On the other hand, Pinochet's government took the in-
itial position that economic development would not be reached without the
contribution of large amounts of foreign investment, and that such capital
inflows should receive extensive guarantees from the State. However, im-
plementation of such policy was limited by Decision 24. Hence, in 1974,
Chile began to exercise pressure in order to reform this Code. Chile was able
to maintain this pressure because its military regime enabled it to take such
a stand without facing internal opposition.
Thus, on July 13, 1974, the Chilean military Junta promulgated Decree
Law 600'4 which regulated foreign investment. This Decree Law was
strongly opposed by the rest of the Andean partners, and the Andean
newspapers launched violent attacks against the Chilean government. The
mutual feeling among the other Pact countries was that the new Chilean
government was attempting illegally to attract foreign investors to the detri-
ment of the other countries. In response to this volatile situation, the Com-
mission-the political organ of the Andean system - declared in September
of 1974"1 that Chilean Decree Law 600 was incompatible with the letter and
spirit of Decision 24. The Commission also called for a special session to
discuss this matter further.' 6 This special meeting was proposed by the
technical organ of the Andean system, known as the Board, to avoid the
continuance of the division among the parties. The Commission also im-
pliedly entrusted the Board with the conciliatory means with which to seek a
13. Caputo and Pizarro, Desarrollismo y Capital Extranjero (1970). See comment on this
book by present Author, I Estudios Juridicos 190 (1972).
14. See text in Decretos Leyes Dictados por La Junta de Gobierno de la Republica de
Chile [hereinafter Decretos] (551-600) 154 (1974).
15. Fifteenth period of the Commission's ordinary meeting.
16. See 39 Grupo Andino 3 (1974); 41 Grupo Andino I annex (1974);
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solution to the problem. Thus, the members of the Board visited Chile in
October 1974. As a result of the Board's talks with the Chilean authorities,
Chilean Decree Law 7467 was issued on November 9, 1974, by which Chile
committed itself to carry out several legal reforms that would allow the com-
plete application of Decision 24. Decree Law 746 expressly stated that Deci-
sion 24 was part of the Chilean legal system. However, at the same time,
Chile began to press the Board to evaluate the practical application of Deci-
sion 24. Chile asserted that this Decision was not receiving uniform applica-
tion due to differences in national legislation affecting foreign investment,
especially in relation to the foreign exchange laws. 8
In response to Chile's dissatisfaction, the Commission entrusted the
Board with the task of studying which reforms were necessary.' 9 For the
purpose of examining the internal national implementations of the Decision
and to ascertain the regulation that this investment code would require, the
Commission convened the Andean Pact's Consultative Committee in
August 1975.1 0 In April, 1976, the Commission decided to create a working
group to study possible amendments to the foreign investment Decision. '
The establishment of this working group was considered to be a successful
product of Chilean lobbying and it was noted that even Peru, who had been
the Decision's strongest supporter, "softened its line." 2  However,
Venezuela commenced a campaign to avoid reforms of Decision 24.
As to the remittance abroad of foreign enterprises' profits, 3 Chile op-
posed the maximum limit of fourteen percent, found in Decision 24, and
also opposed the twenty percent limit found in the Declaration of Boyoca of
August 1976, and later in Decision 103. With regard to the regulation of
foreign investment, Chile criticized the obligation to transform foreign in-
vestment into national or mixed enterprises,2 4 and the prohibition of direct
investment to acquire shares, stock or ownership rights of national in-
vestors, unless those direct foreign investments were performed to prevent
the imminent bankruptcy of the national enterprise.' 5 This last prohibition
limited Chilean efforts to de-nationalize industry, illustrated by General
Pinochet's program to reduce the number of State-controlled enterprises to
twenty-three. At the time of Allende's downfall in 1973, there were 600 en-
17. See text in Dceretos (701-750) 174 (1975).
18. 41 Grupo Andino 3, annex (1974).
19. Id. at 2-6, annex (1974).
20. 48 Grupo Andino 2 (1975). In the seventeenth period of the Commission's ordinary
meetings, this Committee was established by articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Cartagena Agree-
ment. In accordance with article 19, the consultative committee is the organ through which the
member countries shall maintain close ties with the Board.
21 Sixteenth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings.
22. 4 Latin Am. Econ. Rep. 93 (1976).
23. Supra note 1, art. 37, at 919.
24. Chapter I1 of Decision 24.
25. Supra note 1, art. 3 at 910.
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terprises which had been nationalized since the 1930's.11 By November 1976,
the (self-governing) Chilean Promotion of Development Corporation
(CORFO) controlled fifty-five of those 600 enterprises, and it was expected
that by April 1977, the State would eliminate thirty-two others. In addition,
295 of the 600 enterprises were returned to their former owners under the
argument that the nationalization had been illegal, and 250 were sold for
about 335 million U.S. dollars.2"
As a result of Chile's pressures, the Commission in April 1976, adopted
Decision 9728 which authorized Chile to sell to foreign investors the shares,
stocks or ownership rights of the enterprises totally or partially belonging to
CORFO. And, on October 30, 1976, soon after Chile's withdrawal, the
Commission approved Decision 103,5 which essentially modified Decision
24.10 A few other complementary reforms were introduced by Decision 109
in November 1976.11 The approval of Decision 103 had an impact on the
26. Indeed, in his second government (1932-1938), President Arturo Alessandri began a
process of public capitalization with his policy of achieving the State's capital majority in the
nitrate industry. From that time, Chilean governments, including conservative ones, have con-
tributed to the enlargement of the State-owned firms. History shows that Allende only ac-
celerated that process. The fact that there was increasing State participation in the most impor-
tant industries does not conclusively prove a socialist trend among the Chilean governments.
This policy was solely the result of the extreme scarcity of capital coupled with a social con-
sensus on the need to establish certain big industries in order to accomplish economic develop-
ment- Thus, only the State could be the financier.
27. Ercilla. October 27. 1976, pp. 21-22.
28. Sixteenth period of the Commission's special meeting, 54 Grupo Andino I annex
(1976).
29. 59 Grupo Andino 8 annex (1976).
30. The effects were as follows: the profit remittance limit was raised from fourteen per-
cent to twenty percent per year; the automatic reinvestment allowance increased from five per-
cent a year to seven percent; the foreign investor now has access to local short and medium
term credit (not more than three years), foreign investors may buy shares, by means of capital
increase, in existing local companies provided the foreign shareholding does not exceed forty-
nine percent the one year residence required for industrial foreign investors to be considered
national investors can be waived provided the investor still renounces the right to remit profits
or repatriate capital; the Andean nationals investing in one country in the region will be con-
sidered local investors, but can remit profits and repatriate capital like foreign investors; the
commission can agree with non-member Latin American countries to provide a better treat-
ment for their nationals than for outer-region investors; the rules regarding the transformation
from foreign to national or mixed enterprises have been accorded new period times in which to
operate and this transformation can operate by capital increases from investors instead of only
by sales of existing shares; and companies involved in tourism are exempted from the transfor-
mation into national or mixed company rules, on the same basis as previously applied to com-
panies exporting eighty percent or more of their output outside the Andean region. In addition,
the parties can now go beyond the limits imposed for profit remittance and automatic reinvest-
ment allowance by means of two regulations incorporated into article 10: the first allows each
country to choose its own remittance levels above twenty percent, and the second allows each
country to permit reinvestment, or even reinvestment in other companies, of any excess profits
(presumably those over and above the twenty percent remittance level plus the seven percent
reinvestment allowance, though this is not actually specified, See 4 Latin Am. Econ. Rep. 180
(1976). Such investment or reinvestment is now to count as though it were new direct foreign in-
vestment. Despite the important modifications included in Decision 103, these would not have
satisfied the Chilean government which sought even more liberal policies and protection for
foreign investors-
31. 60 Grupo Andino 5 annex (1976).
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future rule of Brazil in Bolivia, as non-member Latin American countries in-
vesting in the region are now benefited. For a long time, Brazil has been in-
crementing its economic importance in Bolivia, especially in the Santa Cruz
region. Decision 103 also gives an advantage to Venezuela, since nationals
investing in the region can remit profits and repatriate capital like foreign
investors.
The Andean Pact's crisis was precipitated by some of the time periods
stated in the Convention. In accordance with the Agreement, important
measures had to be adopted by the December 31, 1975 deadline. Thus, by
that time it was necessary to fulfill obligations pertaining to the Common
External Tariff,32 the Program on Inter-Regional Trade Liberalization,"
and the Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development."
Trade barriers have been traditionally considered in Latin America as
an important instrument for the protection of industry. Thus, during the
negotiations of the Cartagena Agreement, there was unanimous agreement
among the Pact countries on the need for a Common External Tariff, and
the debates focused only on the terms through which it should be achieved.
The antecedent of this Latin American policy is very old. Tariff protec-
tionist measures taken by the Chilean Reglament of Commerce date back to
1822.11 These protectionist measures were accentuated and more broadly
implemented after the 1930's due to the impact of ECLA's recommenda-
tions. The destruction of the international markets, caused by the Great
Depression, obliged the Latin American countries to substitute imports for
national products. The Second World War accentuated this process as the
industrialized countries were producing primarily for their internal markets,
with concentrated industrial efforts on the production of war materials. It is
therefore no surprise that the signatories of the Andean Pact had little dif-
ficulty in establishing a tariff system.
Recently, however, the new Chilean government has drastically
reduced tariff barriers. This change of policy reflects its expectation that due
to international competition, the Chilean industry will have to decrease its
prices, improve its quality and orient itself towards those productive sectors
which the country requires. The Chilean government also argued that high
tariffs were fueling inflation in the Andean countries. 36 In effect, the Chilean
policy pursues a free distribution of resources to those productive sectors
able to compete with foreign goods within the country. On the other hand,
the rest of the Convention's parties con'sidered that the productive sectors
which internally present comparative advantages to foreign commodities
consist primarily of activities such as agriculture and mining. These coun-
tries affirm that the industrial emphasis, which could bring, inter alia, a
higher percentage of employment (the agricultural and mining sectors could
not absorb all the working manpower) is the key to their economic develop-
32. Supra note I, art. 62, par. 1, at 926.
33. Id., art 53, at 923.
34. Id., art 47, par. 3. at 922,
35. Graham, Diario de mi Residencia en Chile 220-221 (1972).
36. The Economist, November 13, 1976, at 129.
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ment. The concentration on one or a few primary-type exports limits the
current income, as well as the accumulation of factor supplies, and can ac-
centuate the dependence on private capital exports from the rich countries.
In addition, the decline of trade stimulus in primary commodities creates an
increasing shortage of foreign exchange earnings from exports to pay for the
various imports needed for economic development. The argument is made
that Chilean policies are based upon an idealistic conception that Chilean
goods will compete with foreign goods abroad. However, foreign markets
are internal markets for other countries, the majority of which strongly
protect their industries, and such foreign markets are predominantly con-
trolled by transnational corporations.
The Andean Pact countries differed as to the limit of protection affor-
ded by the Common External Tariff. Chile struggled for a Common Exter-
nal Tariff with a maximum protection of thirty-five percent, although its
goal was a protection of ten percent. Peru asked for one with a minimum
protection of 150 percent. Colombia pursued a minimum protection of
seventy percent, and both Bolivia and Venezuela wanted a 100 percent limit.
The extreme position taken by Chile is understandable considering that even
Brazil has a protection of eighty percent for consumption goods. With the
establishment of a Common External Tariff, the countries would have to in-
crease or decrease their existing tariffs, thus causing important tax varia-
tions among them. In accordance with the Convention, Bolivia and Ecuador
have a longer period for this adjustment which reduces their problems in im-
plementing such a measure. On the other hand, if the Common External
Tariff involves higher tariffs, less developed countries will have to increase
their cost-of-living. Unless these countries can benefit from the establish-
ment of new industries, they will be in a difficult situation. Consideration
must also be given to the effect of a Common External Tariff on the export
possibilities, as each country had a different pre-existing economic struc-
ture. The Common External Tariff affects the level of exports to third coun-
tries. Thus, if the tariff is high, some Andean countries can increase their
production as foreign competition is consequently reduced and costs go
down as a result of the benefit of a large market. The lower level of costs
could make exports to third countries more likely. Nevertheless, the quality
of production may suffer. As a result of these conflicts among the Andean
countries, no agreement could be reached as to a Common External Tariff
by December 31, 1975, the deadline established by the Cartagena Agree-
ment.
38
The problem arising from the Common External Tariff is related to
other disputed issues. For instance, one of the reasons why transnational
corporations, especially those owned by the United States, establish sub-
sidiaries in Latin America, is to obtain exemption from tariff restrictions,
while also profiting from the large Latin American market.
In order to create a system of joint planning within the industrial sec-
tor, the Convention, in response to the mandate of the Andean Pact, created
37. French-Davis, Pacto Andino y Libre Comercio, Mensaje, October 1976, at 505.
38. Supra note I, art. 62, at 926.
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the Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development. Such Programs allow a
better distribution of benefits from the integration system. In effect, these
Programs plan the allocation of industries in the less developed countries in
the area, whereas under normal conditions, industries would be established
in those countries with better technology, economic infrastructure and an
existing market. The Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development es-
tablish industries that require high technology and assure a big market for
the production.
The Andean parties agreed upon the following provisions: A Decision
dealing with products reserved to Sectorial Programs of Industrial Develop-
ment;3 9 a Sectorial Program covering a number of metal-working opera-
tions; 40 and a Sectorial Program covering the petrochemical industries." As
compared with the goals of the Cartagena Agreement, these agreements
were of extremely limited accomplishment. The Approval in August 1972 of
the Sectorial Program covering the metal-working sector was a product of
two years of negotiations. The fact that the Program required comparatively
less investments than other industrial sectors and used a partly developed
technology, facilitated its adoption. However, the different degrees of in-
dustrial infrastructure among the Andean countries, which led to further
conflict between national interests and integrative goals, had hindered ap-
proval. The same result was seen in other experimentations with the integra-
tion system, such as that of the East African community.
4 2 Ultimately, Chile
and Peru accepted far lesser allocations than their infrastructures would
allow, thus revitalizing the integration system and lending political support
to President Allende and General Velasco Alvarado. In addition, the ap-
39. Decision 25 (third period of the Commission's special meetings. December 14, 1970).
This Decision determined which products were to be reserved to the Sectorial Programs of In-
dustrial Development.
40. Decision 57 (ninth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings, July 10-14, 1972 -
August 17-20, 1972), 16 Grupo Andino 19 annex (1972). This decision states that the parties
had to submit to the Board technical information concerning existing production or feasibility
studies concerning new production units which have been assigned to them (article four). This
requirement had to be fulfilled by September 1974 for Chile, Colombia and Peru, and by Sep-
tember 1975 for Bolivia and Ecuador. The parties presented these documents in August 1974.
Therefore, Bolivia and Ecuador acted one year in advance. It has been thought that Decision 57
will represent a production of three hundred million dollars and employment for one hundred
and ten thousand workers by 1980. See 38 Grupo Andino 1, 2-5 (1974).
Decision 57 has been modified by Decision 57-a (eighth period of the Commission's
special meetings, Sept. 4-9 1972).
For comments on this Sectorial Program see: Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's
Program for Industrial Development of the Metal working Sector, 7 Law Am. 61 (1975);
Guerrero, La Programaclon Conjunta del Desarrollo Industrial Sobregional y el Primer
Programa Sectorial de la Industria Metamecnica, 12 Derecho de la Integraci6n 35 (1973).
41. Decision 91 (seventh period of the Commission's ordinary meetings July t5-25, 1975
and August 26-29, 1975), 48 Grupo Andino I annex (1975).
42. The three parties involved, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, were at different stages of
economic development due to their different colonial experience. Kenya was the most ad-
vanced, followed by Uganda and then Tanzania, Thus, as far as agreeing to locate industries in
a balanced manner, Tanzania's policies or priorities are manifestly different from Kenya's. So,
for example, Tanzania has put more emphasis on light industries, while Kenya has emphasized
consumer products and assembly plants. This divergence in priorities has rendered integration
illusory since the parties cannot agree because their needs are different.
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proval of this Sectorial Program persuaded Venezuela to become a member
of the Andean Pact in February 1973. Once the Commission approved the
program covering the metal-working sector, the Board proposed programs
dealing with the petrochemical, automotive and chemical fertilizer in-
dustries. These three projects were simultaneously considered by the Com-
mission which appointed inter-governmental ad-hoc committees.4" After
much debate on these projects commencing in May 1974," 4 approval was
only granted to the petrochemical program in April 1975. As the Sectorial
Programs involve allocations in the industrial sector, upon which develop-
ment depended, the member countries were extremely sensitive to con-
siderations of equity and harmonious benefit. As to the automotive
program, an advanced stage of discussion was reached, but no ultimate deci-
sion rendered. However, in August 1975, the Commission was able to
allocate the final products and vehicles for each country. 5 The automotive
program had encountered serious problems because of Venezuela's desire to
get sixty percent of the investment on the basis of its share of the car market,
and Colombia's intentions to apportion investment by population, as it was
the most populous country with 33.82 percent of the Andean population.
The rejection of a proposed automotive program demonstrated how
politically delicate the function of the Board had become in proposing deci-
sions to the Commission. This proposal was even attacked by some States as
damaging their bargaining position, producing a negative effect on the
Commission's discussions."
Since July 1975, efforts have been made at the highest political levels, to
reactivate the Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development. "7 In December
1975, the Board made a Proposal concerning a program for the electronic
and telecommunication industries" which has not yet been sufficiently
debated.
The Sectorial Programs require great amounts of investment and quick
development of technology. Considering the economic situation of the An-
dean countries, it is highly questionable whether these States can put into
practical operation several programs in a short-term period. In addition, the
success of the Sectorial Programs depends on the accomplishment made in
other areas of the integration efforts, as the delay or non-implementation of
a single mechanism affects the chance of success of integration. These
Programs would require the effective and homogeneous application of
provisions such as Decision 24, Decision 46 on Andean multinational enter-
43. 36 Grupo Andino 2 (1975).
44. Thirteenth period of the Commission's special meetings.
45. Seventeenth period of the Commission's ordinary meeting, 48 Grupo Andino 2 (1975).
46. Amare, Interns Nacional y Control de Decisiones en un Proceso de Jntegracihn, 18-19
Derecho de la lntegraci 6n 44 (1975). [hereinafter Amare].
47. Declarations of the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia (July 1975), Bolivia and
Venezuela (August 1975), Colombia and Ecuador (August 1975), Colombia and Venezuela
(December 1975); and the declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru
(November 1975). See 47 Grupo Andino 7 (1975); 48 Grupo Andino 9-11 (1975); 51 Grupo An-
dino 15 (1975); 52 Grupo Andino 3 (1975).
48. Proposal 69. See 52 Grupo Andino 3 (1975).
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prises, 49 and uniform anti-trust laws. However, the parties have experienced
significant delays in implementation even where, as in the metal-working
program, there exists some basic industrial infrastructure,
50 such delays are
demonstrative of the infirmities in the various internal economic structures
of the parties concerned. The deadline for the commission's approval of
programs, as provided in accordance with the Cartagena Agreement, was
December 31, 1975, with a consensus reached only as to the metal-working
and petrochemical industries."
The problems incited by the Program of Inter-Regional Trade
Liberalization were related to the adoption of the Sectorial Programs of In-
dustrial Development. Both mechanisms had been designed to be parallel,
but the Liberalization Program developed at a faster rate. Specifically, the
problem concerned products which had been selected for Sectorial
Programs, had not been included therein.
52 Unless the parties established an
agreement for those products by December 31, 1975, an automatic reversion
to the trade liberalization schedule would occur.
This problem reflects the conflict between national interests and in-
tegrative goals. Chile and Colombia felt that by opposing the creation of
new Sectorial Programs or, in the alternative, by urging an extension of the
time period for agreement, they could benefit from the commercial oppor-
tunities of an expanded trade liberalization program. As to the priorities of
agreement, Chile thought that consideration of the Common External Tariff
should precede the new Sectorial Programs, with the view that the Andean
industries should only be established in those productive sectors capable of
competing with foreign enterprises." On the other hand, Bolivia, Ecuador
and Peru argued on behalf of the Cartagena Agreement's principle of es-
tablishing Sectorial Programs, as an essential way of achieving the in-
dustrialization and economic development of the region. Through the im-
plementation of these programs, Bolivia and Ecuador would have a good
opportunity to initiate their industrialization processes. Peru had one of the
worst balance of payment deficits on the continent, and its currency was ex-
tremely overvalued. Thus, Peru did not argue for the Program of Inter-
Regional Trade Liberalization, since its market would be invaded by goods
produced in other Andean countries with realistic currency exchanges.
Eventually, Colombia and Venezuela agreed to postpone the Convention's
time periods for establishing the Sectorial Programs upon those reserved
products, in exchange for Peru's flexibility in its position on the Common
External Tariff. Chile agreed to modify its attitude if the other Andean
countries agreed to new foreign investment regulations and accepted its low
level tariff proposal.
49. Decision 46 (sixth period of the Commission's special meetings. Dec. 9-18, 1971), 1
Economic Integration 326. Spanish text in 10 Grupo Andino 6 annex (1971).
50. 53 Grupo Andino 17 (1976).
51. Supra note 1, art. 47, at 921.
52. Supra note 1, art. 53, at 923.
53. This statement was made by the Chilean Executive Secretary for LAFTA and Andean
Affairs. See Qu6 Pasa, Jan. 8, 1976, at 8.
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Despite this conflict, the Program of Liberalization proved to be one of
the more notable successes of the Andean Pact, due to its automatic and
irrevocable character. 4 As a result of the ten percent automatic annual
reductions, with the purpose of achieving total liberalization by December
31, 198011 and the elimination of "restrictions of all kinds",5 6 there was an
increase in inter-regional trade. "Restrictions of all kinds" were defined by
law as "any measure of administrative, fiscal or exchange character, im-
posed by unilateral decision of a member State which impedes or hinders
importation". 7 Many of the goods favored by the elimination of restraints
were not included in the program of reduction of tariffs. However, the
achievements of the program were limited by the lack of efficient infrastruc-
ture communications and transport systems among the parties, so that most
of the trade increases occurred among neighboring countries. This had the
greatest effect on Bolivia, the Mediterranean member.
The increase in inter-regional trade reflects the proposition that even if
a country has only gained minimally in this matter as compared to another
such country, it is still better off than it would be without the integration
system. However, the major inequalities among the parties with respect to
inter-regional exports had an important political consequence regarding
each country's perception of the benefits received from the integration
system. These inequalities were inconsistent with the Cartagena Agree-
ment's goal of beneficial harmony among the parties. The Andean Pact es-
tablishes a special regime for Bolivia and Ecuador in the Program of
Liberalization, affording them longer time periods and other benefits.
Despite these legal measures, practice has proven that existing infrastruc-
tures are more determinant. From a technical point of view, there is agree-
ment that the volume and composition of inter-regional trade offers impor-
tant research possibilities in the models designed to measure the distribution
of costs and benefits in an integration system."
The highest inter-regional exports in 1969 were those of Colombia and
Peru, which amounted to 25 million U.S. dollars. In 1975, Colombia's ex-
ports to the region amounted to nearly 250 million U.S. dollars. This
represented a tenfold increase in six years, converting this country into the
largest exporter of manufactured goods.59 The total amount of inter-
regional exports in 1975 reached approximately 600 million U.S. dollars.", If
fuel and lubricants exports were included, this total would rise enormously,
54. Supra note 1, art. 45, at 921.
55. Id art. 52, at 923.
56. id. art. 46, at 921.
57. Id. art. 42, at 920.
58. See Report of the Seminar on the Distribution of the Costs and Benefits in Regional
Economic Integration Among Developing Countries(UNCTAD). U.N. Doc TD/B/157(1975)
at 4.
59 A similar concentration of inter-regional exports has occurred in the East African
community with respect to Kenya, but without presenting the dramatic rise of Colombia.
Within East Africa, Kenya's share of inter-regional exports rose from 62 percent to 77 percent
between 1967 and 1974. See Mtei, Experiences in Regional Economic Integration 13 (1976).
60. See 57 Grupo Andino 26, 27 (1976).
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especially for Ecuador and Venezuela during the years 1973-76. The only
decrease in inter-regional exports was the one that affected Chile in 1971-73
when this country suffered its worst political and economic crisis of its
history. The Colombian President of FEDEMETAL, the Colombian
Federation of Metallurgical Industries, sought to renegotiate the Andean
Pact because "Venezuela had burst into an hemispheric power, especially of
industrial and financial character, and the preferential treatment accorded
to Ecuador". 6! ' Colombian President L6pez Michelsen said that their inter-
regional trade could be compared with that carried out with the United
States and Europe, and that the past experience of risks of concentration in
only one market could be avoided.62 The global increase of inter-regional
exports did not solely consist of traditional export goods, but included new
products backed by a relatively complex technology, such as the ones in-
cluded in the Sectorial Program for the metal-working sector. Nevertheless,
there was a great difference among the parties with respect to the proportion
of manufactured goods of each, as represented by Colombia and Bolivia
(the latter with no significant manufactured goods). The Convention
allowed each party to present to the Board a schedule of goods presently
produced in the region as exceptions to the Liberalization Program, to be
submitted by December 31, 1970.63 In this manner the Andean Pact
achieved great success, as eighteen percent of that inter-regional trade was
comprised of goods which appear in the schedule of exceptions of the im-
porting countries.
6 4
However, inter-regional trade represented only a small proportion of
total regional exports. 65 Thus, a former Chilean plenipotentiary commented
that, in 1975, Chilean exports benefiting from the Trade Liberalization
Program were less than 20 million U.S. dollars, while total Chilean exports
were 1,547 million U.S. dollars." The Liberalization Program also damaged
some small and middle-sized manufacturers because they lost tariff
protections.
III
A variety of other factors contributed to the Cartagena Agreement's
crisis. The lack of compliance with the Andean Decisions was a major con-
tributor to the crisis. Each member was obligated by the Convention to in-
clude in its national development plans and economic policies, the measures
necessary to ensure fulfillment of process of harmonization of policies and
coordination of plans. An agreement to take new economic measures has no
value if not accompanied by their internal implementation through ap-
propriate laws and institutions, as well as by a uniform interpretation of the
61. 50 Grupo Andino 4 (1975). (Author's translation).
62. Id. at 4.
63. Supra note 1, art. 55, at 924.
64. 53 Grupo Andino 14 (1976).
65. This has also been the case in the East African community. The share of inter-regional
exports in total East African exports dropped from 18 percent in 1967 to 14 percent in 1974. See
Mtei, supra note 59, at 13.
66. Ercilla, Nov. 10, 1976, at 33.
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rules. This proved to be a difficult task due to the internal legal, economic
and political problems experienced by the countries.
A comprehensive study of the degree of the Andean countries' com-
pliance with the Andean Decisions can only occur subsequent to an evalua-
tion of the practical economic effects of their policies and development
plans in the period 1969-1976. At the present time, however, it is clear that
the parties have neglected their obligation to take the necessary internal
legal measures to carry out the Decisions of the Commission. The farewell
address of the members of the Board, who had been acting since 1970, con-
tained the statement that the governments were behaving as if they were not
represented by their plenipotentiaries in the Commission.6 The parties were
initially concerned with establishing the internal mechanisms for carrying
out the Commission's Decisions, as illustrated by the implementation of
Decision 24. Since 1972, however, the failure of prompt internal implemen-
tation of the Decisions has resulted in the transformation of these Decisions
into formal documents without any practical significance. A vicious cycle
thus developed as the parties failed to show any real enthusiasm in im-
plementing the Andean Decisions, due to a lowering of expectations. The
argument can be made that the members would have been more active in
this respect had the benefits of participating in the integrative experience
been shared by all.
This lack of compliance is illustrated by dilatory implementation of the
various decisions. Decision 496" and regulations concerned with the har-
monization of legislation on industrial development, adopted unanimously
in 1971, had not been implemented in any of the countries until 1976,
despite their significance. Governing the problems of the exemptions, reduc-
tions and rebates on import duties in connection with the Minimum Com-
mon External Tariff and the Program of Trade Liberalization, Decision 49
provides a preliminary step towards harmonization of fiscal incentives. As a
result of the absence of implementation of Decision 49, the Board would
later be less ambitious in its proposals, and thus delay the attainment of
higher levels of integration. 9 This lack of implementation was found among
the Andean multinationals (approved in 1971 and not implemented by all
the countries until 1976), the common rules to avoid double taxation, and
the regulation of internal transportation by highway. These examples form
part of the Decisions by which Chile will continue to be bound despite its
withdrawal from the Pact in 1976. Member States have shown different
degrees of compliance with the Decisions.70
The achievement of formal legal compliance may not be enough, as
national legislation may contain loopholes which permit policies different
from the ones adopted in the Decision. Thus, Chile implemented Decision
24 in 1971, but through Decree Law 600 of 1974, it pursued opposite objec-
67. 53 Grupo Andino 17-19 (1976).
68. Sixth period of the Commission's special meetings, Dec. 9-18, 1971. See 1 Economic
Integration 350-362. Spanish text in 10 Grupo Andino 14-19 annex (1971).
69. 53 Grupo Andino 17 (1976).
70. Cf., 17 Derecho de la Integraci6n 114-123 (1974).
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tives. Compliance with one Decision is not sufficient if another that comple-
ments it is disregarded. The Andean multinational regulation in connection
with the foreign investment code demonstrated that the implementation
must be accompanied by effective economic policy." To have meaning,
uniform and effective application, which implies common regulations and
interpretation, is important in this respect.
There is a need for establishing an Andean Court. A judicial organ, not
a political one, as is the Commission, should have the power to give a
binding opinion relevant to the adequacy of the internal law in fulfilling the
Commission's Decisions. To make this determination, such a court may
evaluate the fulfillment of the parties' obligations, the interpretation of the
integration system's rules and Decisions,72 and the legality of the integration
system's acts. The establishment of an Andean Court can also avoid the ex-
istence of opposing judicial decisions between the parties' tribunals. In addi-
tion, it is highly inconvenient, and often legally impossible, for a national
court to be in charge of taking cognizance of the recourses of illegality, in-
terpretation and, especially, noncompliance. The Court's role as interpreter
would be of great value, since the Andean countries differ in their defini-
tions of such basic legal concepts as the nature and character of some
negotiable instruments.73 Multinational corporations, operating in different
member countries, would be governed by different legislation. The existence
of an Andean Court would avoid unnecessary political tensions, such as
those created by Chilean Decree Law 600, in response to Decision 24. The
Board submitted a proposal for the creation of an Andean Court in 1974,11
and it is still under discussion.
Another source of conflict over the years was the intense politicization
of the integration process seen in the election of the members of the Board,
whose term ran to December 31, 1975, and whose election was contingent
upon unanimity. The Board is the technical organ, consisting of three mem-
bers who must act only "in the concerted interest of the region as a
whole." 75 The Board has an essential role in the progress of the integration
system, especially through its duty of making propositions to the Commis-
71. Common and effective policies have been difficult to pursue in the East African in-
tegration system due to the different political and ideological leanings of the member states.
Thus, Tanzania pursues a socialist path of economic growth which generally discourages in-
vestments and stresses self-reliance on "ujamaa", while Kenya and Uganda are mixed
economies with capitalistic leanings. Also, different stages of industrial development have
prevented joint and effective economic policies.
72. Amare, supra note 46, at 44.
73. Common interpretation with respect to negotiable instruments would be greatly
facilitated through common legislation. The Office of the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions has prepared a DRAFT UNIFORM LAW ON INTERNATIONAL BILLS OF EX-
CHANGE AND PROMISORY NOTES, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/ WG. IV/WP_2 (1972). This
document has received the special attention of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law, see. e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/77 (1973); U.N. Doc A/CN. 9/86 (1974).
U.N. Doc, A/CN. 9/99 (1975); and U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/117 (1976).
74. Proposal 43 (Jan. 18. 1977). See text in Bueno, La Soluci6n de los Conflictos en el
Pacto Andino, 35-42 (1976).
75. Supra note 1, art. 13, at 913.
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sion, and supervising the implementation of the Agreement. As the Com-
mission was unable to find a solution to this problem of filling the vacant
posts, the parties decided unanimously to extend the term of the Board until
February 29, 1976, when they held a special meeting to name the new mem-
bers.7" The Board's past members had served with great idealism for two
terms, consisting of six consecutive years, and many of the Cartagena
Agreement's accomplishments had been due to their action.
In order to quickly harmonize policies and coordinate plans, the parties
must agree upon a strategy for development. Through a consideration of its
elements, the Andean Pact 7 would facilitate economic integration, since it
would determine in a precise way the objectives and priorities of the integra-
tion system, and consider the practical possibilities of any action.
7 Also, an
Andean strategy for development would minimize clashes among the parties
from the time the policies are internally formulated. The Board proposed
such a strategy in March of 1972, but it has not yet been approved by the
Commission."
IV
Between 1970 and 1973, the Andean Pact went through a crisis,
although it never reached the proportions of the crisis to come in 1974.
However, it did create a great concern about the possibility of future
clashes of policies. The election of a socialist-marxist President in Chile at
the end of 1970 raised fears about the possible stagnation of the Andean
Pact. To alleviate these fears, Allende visited Colombia, Ecuador and Peru
in 1971 to assure their leaders that he was willing to support Andean in-
tegration. At that time, there were no diplomatic relations between Chile
and Bolivia, and Venezuela had not yet adhered to the Convention (this ex-
plains why Allende did not visit these countries). As their leftist policies had
created many enemies, President Allende and General Velasco Alvarado of
Peru needed this integration system for political support. But, by the begin-
ning of 1973, after Allende had radicalized his economic policies, Chile was
suffering from the worst political and economic crisis of its history. Thus,
Chile was unable to carry out the Andean goals in the way in which it might
have been capable of doing under normal conditions. Chile began to ask for
exceptions, while simultaneously making innumerable declarations sup-
porting the Andean Pact.80 In 1973, with Venezuela's adherence to the Con-
vention taking place in February, and Pinochet's coup d'6tat occurring in
September, no Decision was adopted dealing with either the harmonization
of policies or any other topic. Thus, concentration of the parties' efforts on
76. Nineteenth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings December 9-12, 1975 and
December 26-31, 1975.
77. Supra note 1, art. 25, at 916.
78. Moore, Aigunas Impliaciones para Ambrica Latina del Experimento de lntegraci6n
Europea, in Factores para la Integraci6n Latinoamericana 89 (1966).
79. "Bases Generales para una Estrategia Subregional de Desarollo." A summary of it has
been published by the Board pursuant to a recommendation of the Planning Council. See text
in: 13 Grupo Andino annex (1972).
80. See. e.g.. the declaration of the Chilean Foreign Minister in the fourth meeting of the
Andean Ministers, August 1-4, 1973, 27 Grupo Andino 32 (1973).
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this incorporation did not prevent the adoption of those Decisions. Rather,
increasing divergencies had already appeared among the parties and the
Chilean internal situation was having an impact on the integration system.
The end of December 1975 came without any agreement regarding the
essential mechanisms upon which the future of Andean integration would
depend. Previously, efforts at the highest level were made to reactivate the
integration process. Now, the Commission held special sessions in March
and April of 1976, the last one resulting in approval of several Decisions."'
Decisions 98 and 101 established special treatment for Bolivia with regard to
its Mediterranean condition and its inferior economic situation. Decision 99
established new rules regarding the Sectorial Programs of Industrial
Development which eventually were reformed by Decision 105.
Decision 100 was the most important of that group of resolutions. This
Decision was unanimously adopted after several months of intense negotia-
tions, and extended the time periods for the Industrial Program, the
Program of Inter-Regional Trade Liberalization and the Common External
Tariff. On August 14, 1976, the plenipotentiaries of all the parties except
Chile signed the "Additional Protocol to the Convention," which contains
Decision 100 plus an additional article.82 This provision states that the
Protocol will be in effect when the members of the Andean Pact have ap-
proved it, in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures, and
have communicated this approval to the Executive Secretary of LAFTA. 3
This article added that if the protocol was not in effect within sixty days af-
ter August 14, 1976, the States that had signed and ratified it would agree as
to the application of the Andean Pact's rights and duties to those that had
not taken these actions. In addition, the representatives of the five
signatories to the Additional Protocol signed the Declaration of Boyoca,
formalizing their criteria regarding Decision 24 and the Common External
Tariff.8 4 These parties called upon Chile to reactivate the Andean integra-
tion by ratifying the Additional Protocol, while reiterating their intention to
allow Chile a special regime of limited duration dealing with the rights and
duties of the Cartagena Agreement and its Decisions.85
On October 5, 1976, the five signatories and Chile subscribed to a
Protocol,"8 in which they agreed to establish a joint Committee to create,
within the following twenty-four days, a special transitory regime for Chile,
which would be an "associate" member. The Protocol stated that if this time
period passed without an agreement being reached, Chile would then
withdraw from the Andean Pact, and its rights and duties under the Agree-
ment would cease on the following day, October 30, 1976. This is what ul-
timately occurred. However, Chile continues to be bound by a group of
81. 54 Grupo Andino 1-5 annex (1976).
82. 57 Grupo Andino 2 (1976).
83. The fact that this communication has to be made to this Executive Secretary is a
reminder that the Andean Pact is legally under LAFTA's scheme, serving as a "frame treaty."
84. See 57 Grupo Andino 2 (1976)
85. 58 Grupo Andino 7 annex (1976).
86. 59 Grupo Andino 1 annex (1976).
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Decisions of potential significance.' The degree of internal implementation
of these Decisions, as well as the fact that they will not be fully effective until
applied within an integrative scheme, demonstrates their questionable im-
portance. These Decisions refer to Andean multinationals, the avoidance of
double taxation,8  internal transportation by highway among the parties,'
and an inter-regional highway network. 9"
A mixed Andean-Chilean commission was formed by the Commission
and a plenipotentiary representative of Chile." The purpose of this mixed
commission was to supervise the application of those Decisions binding on
Chile, and to promote industrial, commercial, financial and technological
cooperation.' 2
Immediately after Chile's withdrawal, the parties promulgated Deci-
sion 105,'1 and the Protocol of Lima, 9" which extended time periods even
further than Decision 100. Decision 105 provided that the Commission ap-
prove or reject, before June 30, 1977, all Board proposals for Sectorial
Programs in the automotive, electronic, telecommunication, siderurgical
and chemical fertilizer industries. By October 31, 1977, all proposals in
other industrial sectors were to be acted upon. In addition, Decision 105
stated that the Commission must create the Special Program in Support of
Bolivia by March 31, 1977. This program was established in Decision 98 to
allow a prompt and proper use of the allocations given to Bolivia within the
Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development, as well as to enable Bolivia
to take full advantage of the Inter-Regional Trade Liberalization. The time
limit to approve the Common External Tariff and to take action on those
products which have been selected for Sectorial Programs, but not yet in-
cluded, was extended until December 31, 1978, by the Protocol of Lima.
This Protocol also extended the time period in which the Program of
Liberalization must achieve full operation until 1990. In addition, this docu-
ment establishes that now the Common External Tariff will include levels of
maximum and minimum protection for regional production, which could
eventually lead to conflicts among the parties because of distortion of com-
87. This situation is regulated by Decision 102 (twentieth period of the Commission's or-
dinary meetings, August 4, 1976 and Oct 30, 1976), 59 Grupo Andino 7-8 annex (1976).
88. Decision 40 (seventh period of the Commission's ordinary meetings. Nov. 8, 1971).
This Decision was adopted in Compliance with the Cartagena Agreement art. 26, par. d, supra
note 1, at 917, and art. 89, id. at 932.
89. Decision 57 (eighth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings, March 13-18,
1972), 11 Grupo Andino 1-3 annex (1972). This Decision is complemented by Decision 69
(tenth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings, Nov. 14-17, 1972), 19 Grupo Andino 7-
12 annex (1972). Both Decisions were adopted in connection with the Cartagena Agreement,
art. 26, para supra note 1, at 917 and art 86, id. at 931.
90. Decision 94 (nineteenth period of the Commission's ordinary meetings, December 9-
12, 1975 and December 26-31, 1975), 52 Grupo Andino 1-6 annex (1975).
91. This Commission was created by the Declaracibn Conjunta Grupo Andino-Chile of Oct
30, 1976, 59 Grupo Andino 3 annex (1976).
92. For a review of the last negotiations between "the Five" and Chile, see Qu6 Pasa,
November 4, 1976 at 4.
93. 59 Grupo Andino I I annex (1976).
94. Id. at 5.
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petition. Decision 104 reduced the average protection of the Minimum
Common External Tariff from forty percent to twenty-eight percent.95
The major efforts made by the five signatories to the Additional
Protocol to keep Chile inside the integration system reflect the importance
of the Chilean population, which is 13.40 percent of the Andean total.
Although its present economic situation is difficult, Chile, which historically
has had one of the largest middle classes in Latin America, can regain its im-
portance as a market. Chile also has one of the most notable industrial in-
frastructures in the region, as well as trained professionals and technicians
- a factor that is relevant to the successful functioning of the Sectorial
Programs of Industrial Development.9 6 However, many Andean Pact Deci-
sions should be re-negotiated, since they were adopted with Chile's interest
taken into account. This is especially true with regard to the Industrial
Program. In this integration system, each resolution represents the result of
a chess game where negotiations balanced long and short term interests of
the parties. Often a country accepted a Decision because it was obtaining
other benefits from an unconnected resolution. Thus, a complete revision of
the Commission's Decision is necessary in theory, but improbable in prac-
tice. The difficulty of this process of revision is well illustrated by the hard
negotiations that preceded Venezuela's adherence in 1973.
Despite the inconveniences caused by the Chilean withdrawal, the con-
tinued participation of this country in the Andean system, in its present
political state, would have brought about the complete stagnation of the in-
tegration process. On the other hand, the costs of Chile's withdrawal are
high. From an economic standpoint, Chile has lost an important market, es-
pecially for certain industries such as those in the metal-working sector. For
example, it has been estimated that an enterprise that produces refrigeration
systems once exported seventy-five percent of its production to the Andean
countries, as there were no tariffs. Now, it will have to pay a tariff of seventy
percent to enter that same market, and therefore cannot compete with
United States, French, Japanese or Brazilian goods. At the same time, the
exportation of refrigeration systems is prohibited in Brazil, and in Argentina
the enterprise must pay tariffs of 100 percent. 97 This diminution of the
Chilean market has consequences for its industrial production and employ-
ment rate. Chilean industrial superiority over most of the other members
guaranteed future benefits from its industrial exports to the region. Chile
has now also lost the possibility of being associated with Venezuela, the only
Latin American country capable of being a significant investor in the conti-
nent. From the political perspective, the Andean Pact offered Chile several
95. Id. at 11.
96. The term "industrial infrastructure" is employed in a broad sense. It includes elements
such as computation capabilities. In this respect, according to the United Nations categoriza-
tion, which depends on the level of data processing sophistication, the Andean countries can be
classified in the following way: initial to basic: Bolivia and Ecuador; basic: Chile, Colombia
and Peru; basic to operational: Venezuela, In Latin America, only Argentina, Brazil and Mex-
ico are in a fully operational situation. See Barquin, Computation in Latin America. I I Latin
American Research Review 76 (1976). Therefore, Chile's withdrawal has an impact upon the
general Andean level of computation capabilities.
97. Ercilla, November 10, 1976, at 35.
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advantages. Among those advantages were a close association with Colom-
bia and Venezuela (the only democracies in South America), close contacts
with the bordering countries of Bolivia and Peru (the only countries
presenting possible future military conflicts), and participation in a common
enterprise with Ecuador and Venezuela (two of the world's chief oil ex-
porting countries).
At the time of Chile's withdrawal from the Pact, Chilean Officials dis-
cussed the possibility that now Chile might join the members of the River
Plate Basin system (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
with whom Chile would feel more politically compatible. However, this
body does not represent an economic integration; rather, it is a treaty of
physical integration of the River Plate Basin, a zone to which Chile does not
belong. Chile's position in that scheme would be one of dependence in rela-
tion to the industrial, technological and agricultural advantages of associa-
tion with Argentina and Brazil.
V
For the remaining parties in the Cartagena Agreement, the major task
of reactivating this system remains ahead, especially since important time
restrictions must be fulfilled by 1977-78. To accomplish this task, these
countries should concentrate their efforts on bringing about a change in the
problem of non-implementation of the Commission's Decisions. The Board
and the Andean intellectual communities should take a special role in
creating this awareness. After six years of experience, the Board also noted
an administrative attitude of negligence in the Andean countries? 8 Unfor-
tunately, the Cartagena Agreement has not been accompanied by suppor-
tive attitudes from a broader spectrum of forces than the intellectual elite, as
great ignorance about the integration goals exists among the bureaucrats
and technicians that are concerned with these matters. The idealism of the
national offices in charge of integration affairs is insufficient, considering
their budgetary and personnel limitations. The integration offices have to
deal with other bureaucratic departments on which they often depend for in-
formation, and the elaboration of studies and execution of projects. This
ignorance is even more accentuated at the level of general public opinion.
Hence, the governments did not feel any internal pressure to motivate them
to take any practical steps toward implementing the Decisions, and history
shows that the governments of many Andean countries tend to act more ef-
fectively under this kind of pressure. It is necessary, then, to initiate
educational campaigns in which the press can, and is encouraged to play an
active role. Courses on economic integration should be compulsory in the
Schools of Law, Political Science and Economics, and seminars dealing with
the topic should be carried out in the Ministries. The Catholic Church per-
ceived this situation when it proposed an intense discussion of the Car-
tagena Agreement within the Andean community.99 Another reason for
public apathy towards the integration process has been the failure of the
98. 53 Grupo Andino 17 (1976).
99. See 40 Grupo Andino 12 (1972); 54 Grupo Andino 6 (1976).
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parties to incorporate workers and consumers into the elaboration and dis-
cussion of projects.
In addition, some structural changes must occur. One of those reforms
would require that the Board name a national of each State to supervise the
practical steps taken in that country towards fulfilling the integrative goals:
a type of "Andean Comptroller." This person could be tenured for two
years and could be re-elected by the Board for additional terms. His func-
tion would be that of special liaison between the Board and the President of
his country. This person could be empowered to make public evaluations of
the role played by his country in the integration process. 00 Another step in
this direction could simulate the one taken by Peru, a country which es-
tablished the Ministry of Integration in 1976,101 whose function was to
propose a national policy of integration, direct its execution, and promote
the necessary national actions to insure Peru's participation in the economic
and social integration of Latin America. This is an important step since the
strength of the important bureaucratic interests within a government vary
according to budgetary and personnel considerations.102 Thus, the Ministry
could press for the fulfillment of the Decisions in a position of equality with
respect to other Ministries, and would be better able to centralize informa-
tion and carry out projects.
Other ways to reactivate the process are to establish a judicial system,
agree upon a common strategy for Andean development, and concentrate
more attention on those matters in which harmonization of policies is dis-
cretionary. Other measures would be the inception of the process of the
coordination of national development plans, improvement of the national
decision-making process as related to the implementation and proposal of
Decisions, the establishment of common regulations and interpretation for
the Decisions and related laws, and implementation without delay of those
Decisions designed to complement others already implemented. The main-
tenance of the independence of the Board, development of a more critical at-
titude on the part of the Board and the Andean intellectuals about the in-
tegration process, and attaining consensus on essential aspects of economic
policy with an undisturbed stability over time are other ways to reactivate
the process. In addition, the member nations must be aware of the dangers
of an increasing politicization of the process, of the prevalence of national
interest over integration goals, and finally, of the unequal benefits derived
for the parties from the system.
100. This reform is legally possible. See Cartagena Agreement, art 15, par. a, supra note 1,
at 913.
101. Decree 12, 549 of the Council of Ministers. See 56 Grupo Andino 8 (1976).
102. In connection with the bureaucratic model, see, e.g., Allison, The Essence of Decision
(1971); Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (1972); Halperin, Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy (1974); Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 63
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 689 (1969), Allison and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Some Policy
Implications, 24 World Pol. 40 (1971-72); Art, Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign
Policy. 4 Policy Studies 467 (1973); Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?, 7 Foreign Policy
159 (1972); Thompson, On the Making of U.S. China Policy 1961-1969, 50 the China Q 220
(1972).
ANDEAN PACT
External factors can also play an important role in this reactivation of
the Andean Pact, as is demonstrated by that played by the "Rosenthal
Report" with respect to the Central American Common Market."
0 3 Among
these factors can be the influence of foundations, governments and inter-
national organizations."' An important first step in this regard has been
taken by Canada which contributed Canadian $2,850,000, not reimburs-
able, in the midst of the discussion in which the future of the integration
system was being decided.0 5
103. The Rosenthal Report was elaborated by the Permanent Secretariat of the Central
American Common Market in collaboration with other regional institutions and international
agencies such as UNCTAD. It contains a detailed study of the evolution of the Central
American integration and its future prospectives. See text: El Desarrollo Integrado de Cen-
troamerica en la Presente Dbcada, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de lntegraci6n
Econ6mica Centro Americana (1973). For a study dealing with the report see, Willmore,
Second Thoughts on Central America, 13 Journal of Common Market Studies 280 (1975).
104. The Latin American integrationalist movement has arisen principally by the initiative
of the Latin Americans themselves. Nevertheless, especially at its very beginning, foreign in-
fluence played a major role. In connection with the point see Vargas-Hidalgo, The Process of
Integration in America, 57 Revista de Derecho Puertoruiquerlo (1977); 15. Comp. Jur. Rev.
(1978).
105. 55 Grupo Andino 2 (1976). Previously, in September 1971 and March 1973, Canada
had only given (Canadian $800,000) to the Andean Pact.
